

This paper was accepted for publication in *Nature Human Behavior*. This is a non-final non-copy-edited version of the paper.

Black and Latinx Conservatives Upshift Competence Relative to Liberals in Mostly- White Settings

Cydney H. Dupree^{1*}

¹School of Management, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA

*Corresponding author: Cydney H. Dupree (cydney.dupree@yale.edu)

Abstract

Racial minorities vary in their sociopolitical views—as figures like Barack Obama and Ted Cruz often demonstrate. I examine implications for interracial behavior, proposing that Black and Latinx conservatives—specifically, those more supportive of hierarchy—upshift competence relative to liberals in mostly-White settings, distancing themselves from stereotypes. Analyzing 250,000 congressional remarks and one million tweets revealed that Black and Latinx conservatives (determined by voting behavior) referenced high power and ability more than liberals. No such pattern emerged for White politicians. Meta-analyzing four experiments further revealed that Black conservatives (determined by social dominance orientation) referenced high status more than liberals with a White (but not Black) partner. This was robust to controls and unique to hierarchy-based conservatism. Finally, analyzing 18,000 editorials suggested implications. The more minority conservatives referenced power in Congress, the more journalists referenced power in editorials about them. Findings highlight the diverse ideology of racial minorities—and behavioral implications.

Main

Recent months have witnessed public outcries for organizations and media outlets to amplify the voices of Black Americans, particularly in the wake of global protests and social media movements like #BlackOutTuesday. Simultaneously, as the nation¹, political parties², and workforces³ diversify, racial minorities have more opportunities to make their voices heard: on social media, in political arenas, and in organizations. However, not all voices are the same. As prominent public figures like Barack Obama, Ben Carson, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, and Ted Cruz often demonstrate, racial minorities' sociopolitical views vary. This research tests the possibility that sociopolitical ideology predicts how Black and Latinx Americans communicate with White Americans, with implications for how they are seen and portrayed.

People adopt impression management goals and behaviors to ensure acceptance from others, smiling to present warmth or subtly mentioning accomplishments to present competence⁴. Little research, however, considers how the racial identity of an actor or target impacts self-presentation—and even less focuses on racial minorities⁵. The current research takes this step. First, it tests *whether* Black and Latinx conservatives' verbal behavior differs from that of liberals in majority-White settings. Second, it tests *how* Black and Latinx conservatives' verbal behavior differs from that of liberals in interracial contexts. Third, it explores the *implications* of such behavioral discrepancies for how the media portrays

Black and Latinx conservatives versus liberals. Examining racial minorities' verbal behavior can illuminate who reverses stereotypes, potentially allowing them to more easily receive social support, secure coveted jobs, or win elections.

People are all too aware of the stereotypes—largely-unspoken but widely-known labels applied to social groups—that are applied to them. White Americans are stereotyped as high in competence but low in warmth: high-status, but bigoted^{6,7}. Black Americans are stereotyped as middling in warmth, but low in competence: lacking in status, power, or ability^{6,8}. These stereotypes are “in the air”, and we carry them with us into social scenarios. In interracial interactions, White Americans have the goal to be liked, countering stereotypes that they are bigoted. Black and Latinx Americans, however, have the goal to be respected, countering stereotypes that they are low in competence or status⁹. These impression management goals can impact people's interracial behaviors, particularly among those who most desire to distance themselves from stereotypes. For example, White liberals—who tend to be more affiliative toward racial minorities—reference competence less when speaking to a mostly-minority (versus mostly-White) audience¹⁰, reversing stereotypes that depict them as high-status—and, ironically, approaching stereotypes that depict racial minorities as low-status—in a likely well-meaning, if patronizing, phenomenon.

Black and Latinx Americans may also reverse stereotypes in interracial settings, resulting in “competence upshift” toward a higher-status outgroup, White Americans. This phenomenon should be strongest among those who most desire to distance themselves from low-status/-competence ingroup stereotypes. Black and Latinx conservatives—specifically, those most amenable to inequality—should be most likely to exhibit such ingroup distancing.

Social psychologists have largely explored sociopolitical ideology among White Americans, with comparatively little experimental research examining ideology among Black and Latinx Americans. This may be due to the common misconception that Black Americans are overwhelmingly liberal. The vast majority of Black Americans identify with the Democratic political party and vote for the party's political candidates^{11,12}. However, there is variability in Black ideology. In a 2012 ANES survey, 45% of Black respondents identified as conservative, with only slightly more (47.5%) identifying as liberal—despite the fact that 90% identified with the Democratic party¹². This tendency to identify as Democrat is likely due to notions that the Democratic party is more suitable to advance ingroup interests¹³. Nonetheless,

this disconnect between Black Americans' partisan and ideological identification has been documented by several political scientists^{12,14}. Black Americans are no ideological monolith.

Even less research examines ideology among Latinx populations, but existing work suggests that Latinx people tend to identify as liberal, particularly if their families have long resided in the United States^{15,16}. Nonetheless, there is variability in the degree to which Latinx individuals identify as conservative—variability rooted in skin color, generational differences, national origin, gender, and other factors¹⁶.

This variability in Black and Latinx Americans' ideology has implications for inter- and intra-group attitudes, preferences, and behaviors. Black conservatives—specifically, those more supportive of hierarchy—show less pro-ingroup bias and ingroup identification than liberals^{17,18,19}. Black conservatives are also less affiliative toward Black Americans and more affiliative toward White Americans than liberals²⁰. Latinx populations can also adopt the colorblind beliefs that often characterize modern conservatism, to preserve mental health or promote structural stability²¹.

For Black and Latinx Americans, conservatism predicts distancing from the ingroup. Conservatives should thus be more likely to distance themselves from the lower-status ingroup when communicating with the higher-status outgroup, reversing stereotypes that depict them as low in competence/status^{6,8}. Hypothesis 1 therefore predicts that Black and Latinx conservatives engage in a competence upshift, referencing high competence more than Black and Latinx liberals when speaking to a mostly-White audience or a White interaction partner (Hypothesis 1).

Although a unidimensional ideological construct can be useful when exploring the relationship between politics and various behaviors, richer constructs are needed to fully examine the ideology underlying competence upshift. There are two broad dimensions of socio-political ideology. These dimensions are defined differently throughout the literature²², but I characterize them as hierarchy-based and values-based. Hierarchy-based conservatism, which has also been referred to as anti-egalitarianism²³ or economic conservatism²², is rooted in a preference for group-based dominance and inequality. Values-based conservatism, which has also been referred to as social conservatism²², is rooted in a preference for morals, tradition, and authority figures. These ideological dimensions are related to each other but reflect distinct values and motivations. This work thus advances theory by measuring multiple indicators

of ideology and determining which most strongly predicts a competence upshift, further establishing their discriminant validity.

Two different measures assessed hierarchy-based conservatism. In field studies, I used DW-NOMINATE²⁴, a validated measure of politicians' behavioral support for hierarchy based on their roll-call voting decisions in Congress, capturing "roughly speaking, the conflict between rich and poor"²⁵. DW-NOMINATE is therefore an index of politicians' support for hierarchy based on votes for or against policies that maintain or mitigate that economic conflict. In experiments, I used Social Dominance Orientation (SDO), which measures people's professed preference for hierarchy or group-based dominance²⁶. In experiments, I used Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) to assess values-based conservatism, which measures a preference for tradition, religion, and authority²⁷. Finally, in experiments, I used a single-item liberal-conservative scale to assess self-reported ideology.

Of these three indices of conservatism—hierarchy-based, values-based, and self-reported—hierarchy-based conservatism should be most likely to predict a competence upshift among Black and Latinx politicians and laypeople (Hypothesis 2). For racial minorities, hierarchy-based conservatism corresponds to distancing from the low-status ingroup^{17,18,19}, making it most likely to predict stereotype reversal. In contrast, values-based conservatism reflects a preference for ingroup cohesion, predicting protective, avoidance-based reactions^{22,28} rather competitive, approach-based ones. Self-reported conservatism can correspond to both ideological dimensions, but this single-item measure is largely invalid among Black Americans¹². Thus, DW-NOMINATE should predict a competence upshift among Black and Latinx politicians, while SDO should predict a competence upshift among Black participants.

Language is the primary, most basic tool that humans arm themselves with upon embarking on any social enterprise. Language wins arguments, jobs, and elections. This work focuses on how, via language, people convey one of the fundamental dimensions of person and group perception: competence. According to social cognition, people must first evaluate others on warmth ("what is their intent?") and competence ("can they act on their intent?")²⁹. People must also convey their own warmth and competence, particularly if they want to meet certain interpersonal goals. Leveraging recent advances in natural-language processing, I test the stereotype content of politicians' and laypeople's speech along three subdimensions of competence: status, power, and ability. Status is commonly defined as social standing—one's prominence, respect, and influence among others^{8,30}. Ability, or agency, is commonly

defined as the capability to efficiently pursue goals³¹. Power is commonly defined as influence over others—via control of resources or punishment^{8,32}. All are empirically and conceptually related. (Indeed, Black and Latinx Americans are stereotyped as lower in status, power, and ability than White Americans^{6,8}.) They can, however, have distinct antecedents and consequences— impacting whether people upshift status, ability, or power. Testing whether Black and Latinx conservatives upshift status, ability, or power in mostly-White settings is a theoretical contribution of this work, for it moves beyond competence broadly to add needed specificity to the stereotyping and self-presentation literatures.

Status and ability are thought to be primary. Because resources (power) are conferred by others to those seen as advancing group interests, establishing social standing is of first concern. And, in hierarchies often assumed to be merit-based³³, one must establish ability to wield power effectively. This may be why leaders experience threat if they have power without having first established status or ability³⁴. Thus, if people wish to present themselves as high in competence, context should determine whether people upshift status, power, or ability. In novel social scenarios with strangers (e.g., introductions to strangers, remarks on social media), Black and Latinx conservatives should be most likely to present status or ability (Hypothesis 3A). However, in professional scenarios with peers wherein status and ability have already established (e.g., Congressional hearings with elected officials), Black and Latinx conservatives should be most likely to present power (Hypothesis 3B).

Four studies tested hypotheses. Studies 1 and 2 first tested whether Black and Latinx conservative politicians reference more power, status, or ability than liberals in mostly-White settings by analyzing the stereotype content of over 250,000 Congressional remarks and nearly one million tweets (H1). Black and Latinx conservatives should be most likely to present status or ability among White strangers (H3A), but they should be most likely to reference power among Congressional peers (H3B). Study 3 recruited Black American adults to determine whether hierarchy-based conservatives reference status, power, or ability more than liberals when introducing themselves to a presumably-real White interaction partner. This study tested whether the competence upshift is robust to controls and is unique to interracial (versus same-race) interactions. Study 3 also determined whether hierarchy-based (versus values-based or self-reported) conservatism most strongly predicts a competence upshift (H2). Meta-analyses of four experiments featuring over 1,000 Black Americans determined the reliability and robustness of results. As exploratory steps, Study 3 tested whether ingroup bias, contact, or identification also predict a competence upshift. Finally, Study 4 considered implications, testing whether Black and Latinx

conservatives' competence references in Congress corresponds to journalists' competence references in editorials about them by analyzing nearly 18,000 editorials about Black, Latinx, and White politicians.

Results

Study 1. Study 1 tested predictions by capturing White, Black, and Latinx politicians' naturalistic verbal behavior in a real-world, majority-White setting: the United States Congress. Although the most racially and ethnically diverse it has ever been², Congress remains predominantly White. During their term in office, every lawmaker has the opportunity to speak on the Congressional floor, providing an opportunity to test hypotheses in an ecologically valid setting. Leveraging recent advances in natural language analysis, Study 1 tested whether hierarchy-based conservatism predicts Black and Latinx lawmakers' (N = 310) references to power, status, or ability in this majority-White setting.

A main effect of politician race emerged to predict references to high ability: Overall, Black and Latinx politicians referenced high ability less than White politicians, $t(306) = -2.34$, $p = .004$. $\beta = -.16$, 95% CI = $[-.28, -.05]$. A main effect of politician ideology also emerged to predict references to high power: Overall, conservative politicians referenced high power more than liberal ones, $t(306) = 4.08$, $p < .001$, $\beta = .23$, 95% CI = $[.12, .34]$. This main effect was qualified by an interaction with politician race, $t(306) = 2.20$, $p = .028$, $\beta = .12$, 95% CI = $[.01, .23]$. Hierarchy-based conservatives and liberals (those with estimated DW-NOMINATE scores of 0.43 and -0.59 , respectively, one standard deviation above and below the mean of -0.08) diverged in their power references on the Congressional floor. This divergence was unique to Black and Latinx politicians. Black and Latinx conservatives (M = 4.50) referenced high power more than liberals (M = 4.20) when speaking to their mostly-White peers, $t(306) = 4.49$, $p < .001$, $\beta = .35$, 95% CI = $[.20, .51]$. There was no difference between White conservatives (M = 4.43) and liberals (M = 4.34), $t(306) = 1.31$, $p = .191$, $\beta = .11$, 95% CI = $[-.05, .26]$, (Figure 1). No other effects were observed, $ps > .100$.

Study 2. Having found initial support for predictions, I next sought to replicate findings in another ecologically valid field setting by examining how members of the 116th U.S. Congress (N = 511) present themselves on the majority-White social media platform Twitter. Interactions between voters and lawmakers occur with increasing frequency online—most notably, on Twitter. Twitter users create an online profile from which they write and post brief messages (tweets) of 280 characters or fewer that are instantly accessible to other users. In June 2020, Twitter was one of the top five most popular social

media websites, with 20% of all U.S. internet users logging on daily. Politicians have realized the potential of social media sites and now use them to launch soft campaigns³⁵. Study 2 tested predictions in this dynamic online context, determining whether Black and Latinx conservatives upshift competence relative to liberals in this majority-White online community (H1). As anticipated (H3), Black and Latinx conservatives should prioritize presenting status or ability in novel social settings with strangers.

Main effects of politician ideology emerged to predict politicians' references to high status and ability in their tweets: Overall, conservatives referenced high status ($t(507) = 2.52, p = .012, \beta = .22, 95\% \text{ CI} = [.05, .39]$) and ability ($t(507) = 3.99, p < .001, \beta = .35, 95\% \text{ CI} = [.18, .53]$) more than liberals. The latter main effect was qualified by an interaction with politician race, $t(507) = 3.91, p < .001, \beta = .35, 95\% \text{ CI} = [.17, .52]$. Hierarchy-based conservatives and liberals (those with estimated DW-NOMINATE scores of 0.51 and -0.41 , respectively, one standard deviation above and below the mean of 0.05) diverged in their ability references on social media. Once again, this divergence was unique to Black and Latinx politicians. Black and Latinx conservatives ($M = 3.63$) referenced high ability more than liberals ($M = 3.11$) in their tweets, $t(507) = 4.11, p < .001, \beta = .70, 95\% \text{ CI} = [.37, 1.03]$. There was no difference between White conservatives ($M = 3.30$) and liberals ($M = 3.30$), $t(507) = 0.14, p = .886, \beta = .01, 95\% \text{ CI} = [-.09, .10]$ (Figure 2). No other significant effects were observed, $ps > .120$.

Analyzing nearly 250,000 congressional remarks and one million tweets by Black, Latinx, and White politicians yielded three conclusions. First, Black and Latinx lawmakers who are more supportive of hierarchy presented more competence than their more liberal peers when speaking on the floor of the majority-White Congress and posting on the majority-White social media platform. Second, Black and Latinx conservatives were especially likely to upshift power in Congress and ability on social media, supporting the theorized framework. Elected officials prioritized presenting power in Congress among colleagues—where status and ability has already been established. However, they prioritized presenting ability on social media among constituents—where ability or status may not be established. Finally, not all conservatives upshifted competence: White conservatives did not upshift relative to liberals.

Study 3. Studies 1 and 2 had numerous advantages: ecologically valid settings, extremely large samples of political speech, and non-obtrusive methodologies. There were, however, limitations. For one, their correlational nature precludes ruling out alternative explanations. Black and Latinx conservatives may also upshift competence to a same-race audience, suggesting a main effect of ideology whereby

minority conservatives upshift competence to anyone, regardless of audience race. Study 3 (N=406) tested this alternative by manipulating interaction partner race, including a same-race partner control condition.

The objective of Study 3 was to therefore examine the stereotype content of Black participants' open-ended introductions to a presumed-real White or Black interaction partner. This study focuses on Black Americans for three reasons. First, research suggests that Black Americans are stereotyped as lowest in status and competence⁶. Second, there is (lamentably) more empirical research documenting these stereotypes toward Black Americans than Latinx individuals. Finally, monoracial Black Americans are more frequently represented in online marketplaces than monoracial non-White Latinx individuals. The primary hypothesis predicted that Black Americans who are more conservative present more competence than those who are more liberal when introducing themselves to a White interaction partner (H1). As anticipated (H3A) this effect should be strongest when predicting references to high status or ability.

A main effect of hierarchy-based conservatism emerged to predict Black Americans' references to high status in their written introductions: Overall, hierarchy-based conservatives referenced high status more than liberals, $t(403) = 2.87$, $p = .004$, $\beta = .14$, 95% CI = [.04, .24]). Although the SDO \times Partner Race interaction did not reach statistical significance ($t(403) = 0.49$, $p = .621$, $\beta = .03$, 95% CI = [-.07, .12]), predictions asserted that Black hierarchy-based conservatives reference high status more than liberals with a White partner. The omnibus interaction test is thus not optimally suited to test this pattern of slopes, as the interaction test is insensitive to predictions containing one null slope (versus a crossover)³⁶. I therefore examined simple slopes to test the *a priori* hypothesis that hierarchy-based conservatives would reference high status more than liberals with a White interaction partner. As predicted, and consistent with prior studies, Black hierarchy-based conservatives and liberals (those with estimated SDO scores of 2.89 and 1.01, respectively, one standard deviation above and below the mean of 1.94) diverged in their status references. This divergence was unique to a White partner. Black hierarchy-based conservatives ($M = 2.38$) referenced high status more than liberals ($M = 1.81$) when introducing themselves to a White partner, $t(403) = 2.30$, $p = .022$, $\beta = .16$, 95% CI = [.02, .30]. No significant difference emerged with a same-race partner ($M_{\text{conservatives}} = 2.19$, $M_{\text{liberals}} = 1.77$; $t(403) = 1.75$, $p = .081$, $\beta = .12$, 95% CI = [-.01, .26]). No other significant effects were observed, $ps > .050$.

Meta-analyses. Social scientists caution against relying on a single study to evaluate the robustness and reliability of a phenomenon, particularly when the effect size being detected is small³⁷. Thus, four total studies (Studies 3a–3d: total N = 1,189) employed Study 3’s paradigm to test whether hierarchy-based, values-based, or self-reported conservatism predicted competence references with a White partner. The final study (reported in Study 3) is now referred to as Study 3d. See Supplementary Table 7 for demographic characteristics of each study and Supplementary Table 8 for within-study effects. Meta-analyzed results supported predictions. Across studies, Black hierarchy-based conservatives referenced high status more than liberals when introducing themselves to a White partner, $z = 3.87$, $p < .001$, Mean ES = .16, 95% CI = [.08, .24]. No difference was found in introductions to a Black partner, $z = -0.51$, $p = .611$, Mean ES = $-.02$, 95% CI = $[-.10, .06]$ (Table 1). This effect remained after controlling for demographic variables thought to relate to Black conservatism: socio-economic status (SES) and age³⁸ ($p < .001$; Supplementary Table 9). Finally, RWA predicted interracial power references: Values-based conservatives referenced high power less than liberals with a White partner, Mean ES = $-.11$, 95% CI = $[-.21, -.01]$, $z = -2.15$, $p = .032$. More work is needed, but this may represent a reversal of stereotypes depicting Black Americans as hostile or aggressive³⁹. No other effects reached significance, $ps > .161$.

Exploratory analyses. As theorized, SDO predicted reduced ingroup favoritism (pro-Black bias, ingroup identification, ingroup contact); SDO was unrelated to outgroup favoritism (Supplementary Table 10). However, reduced ingroup favoritism did not predict more status references with a White partner ($ps > .151$; see Supplementary Tables 11 and 12 for within-study and meta-analyzed effects). Finally, I explored whether SES or age predicted theorized effects. Lower- (versus higher-) SES participants referenced high status more with a White partner, Mean ES = $-.11$, 95% CI = $[-.21, -.00]$, $z = -2.15$, $p = .043$ (see Supplementary Tables 13 and 14 for within-study and meta-analyzed effects).

Study 4. Having provided archival and experimental evidence that Black and Latinx hierarchy-based conservatives upshift competence in mostly-White settings, Study 4 considers implications by asking: Does Black and Latinx conservatives’ verbal behavior in mostly-White settings correspond to how they are described by others? People notice subtle signals delivered via language, converging in their opinions based on brief thin-slices of behavior⁴⁰. They attend to subtle signs of social status via language, biasing hiring preferences⁴¹. Content of political speech can predict public approval months later⁴². In a social world, language matters. Study 4 examines how Black and Latinx conservatives’ language matters, focusing on crucial observers of political behavior: journalists. Journalists, who tend

to be White and male⁴³, observe Congressional remarks and can influence the public via their portrayals of politicians. By analyzing the content of editorials about the politicians examined in Study 1, Study 4 (N=279) tests whether Black and Latinx politicians' competence references in Congress (as predicted by DW-NOMINATE) corresponds to journalists' competence references in editorials about them. These analyses were exploratory and did not test *a priori* hypotheses.

Correlations revealed that politicians' high power references in Congress was positively correlated with journalists' high power references in editorials, $r(277) = .14$, $p = .028$, 95% CI [.02, .26]. Politician race was negatively associated with journalists' power references: Journalists were less likely to reference high power in editorials about Black and Latinx politicians, $r(277) = -.15$, $p = .011$, 95% CI [-.27, -.04]. As an exploratory step, regression analyses next predicted journalists' power references. A main effect of politician race emerged to predict journalists' references to high power: Journalists referenced high power less in editorials about Black and Latinx politicians than in those about White politicians, $t(275) = -2.51$, $p = .013$, $\beta = -.15$, 95% CI [-.27, -.03]. No other effects reached significance, $ps > .054$.

Finally, moderated mediation analyses revealed that, for Black or Latinx politicians, the relationship between politician ideology and journalists' power references in editorials was mediated by politicians' power references in their congressional speech (indirect effect = .06, 95% CI [.01, .11]) (Figure 3A). This effect did not reach significance among White politicians (indirect effect = .01, 95% CI [-.02, .06]) (Figure 3B). Although the c path did not reach significance among Black and Latinx politicians, it is now widely accepted by proponents of more modern approaches to mediation analyses that this path does not have to reach significance to provide evidence of mediation⁴⁴. These analyses were exploratory, and mediators were not manipulated to support causality—readers should interpret these results with caution. Nonetheless, they provide initial evidence of a relationship between variables.

General discussion

The ability to effectively navigate diverse settings constitutes the ultimate social advantage. Diversity is both inevitable¹ and beneficial⁴⁵, but stereotypes can prompt anxiety, tension, and concerns in diverse settings^{9,46}. This research reveals one means by which Black and Latinx conservatives may gain a social advantage—by reversing stereotypes in majority-White settings. I first tested predictions by analyzing the stereotype content of over 250,000 Congressional remarks and one million tweets. As anticipated, Black and Latinx politicians who show more behavioral support for inequality—hierarchy-based

conservatives—referenced high power and ability more than liberals when speaking on the majority-White Congressional floor or posting on the majority-White social media platform Twitter. No such evidence was found among White politicians. Meta-analyzing four experiments extended findings, finding that Black Americans higher in social dominance orientation—hierarchy-based conservatives—referenced high status more than those liberals when introducing themselves to a White (but not Black) interaction partner. This effect held after controlling for socio-economic status and age, and it was unique to hierarchy-based (versus values-based or self-reported) conservatism. Finally, analyzing 18,000 editorials suggested implications, finding that this subtle difference in Black and Latinx conservatives' (versus liberals') speech corresponds to the stereotype content of journalists' editorials about them.

This work makes several interdisciplinary empirical and theoretical contributions. First, it contributes to social psychological research on stereotyping and intergroup dynamics by examining stereotype transmission through speech in interracial contexts. Stereotypes travel, and they largely do so via speech. Police use less respectful language when stopping Black community members versus White ones⁴⁷, while White Democrats use less competence-related language when addressing mostly-Black or -Latinx audiences¹⁰. These remarks have consequences for social acceptance. Positivity in congressional language predicts public support⁴², while status cues in speech predict hiring preferences³⁸. Indeed, power references in minority politicians' remarks predicted power references in editorials about them.

This work also contributes to research in political psychology, political science, and sociology by examining how multiple dimensions of ideology—namely, hierarchy- and values-based conservatism—manifest in verbal behavior. Political ideology can predict outcomes that maintain inequality, including what policies people support¹⁷, who they show empathy toward⁴⁸, and whose accomplishments they promote²³. However, only a small subset of research has considered political ideology among racial minorities^{11–20}—and even less has taken experimental approaches to examine implications for verbal behavior. This work suggest that conservatism—specifically, hierarchy-based conservatism—can predict racial minorities' behavior toward White Americans. Black and Latinx Americans who are more amenable to inequality portray themselves as anything but disadvantaged.

This work is not without limitations that pave the way for future study. The primary hypothesis proposed that Black and Latinx conservatives—specifically, hierarchy-based conservatives—disconfirm low-status/-competence stereotypes by upshifting competence, thus distancing themselves from the

(low-status) ingroup when interacting with the (high-status) outgroup. Intercorrelations and exploratory analyses support this framework. Social dominance orientation—an indicator of hierarchy-based conservatism—was associated with reduced ingroup favoritism: less ingroup bias, ingroup identification, and ingroup contact. However, reduced ingroup favoritism did not significantly predict a status upshift when meta-analyzed across four studies. It appears that hierarchy-based conservatism—more than bias, identification, and contact—most strongly predicts this upshifting behavior. However, this may be due to methodological factors (e.g., flaws in how ingroup bias, identification, and contact were measured). Additional work is therefore needed to clarify the processes at work behind this behavioral phenomenon. Such work can include more fine-grained indicators of ingroup favoritism. Future work can also consider the role of racial essentialism (the belief that racial hierarchies are natural) which predicts stereotyping⁴⁹.

Manipulating audience characteristics may also prove illuminating—for example, by testing whether Black or Latinx conservatives are more likely upshift competence toward White conservatives, who are associated with dominance⁵⁰. If so, Black and Latinx conservatives may be most likely to upshift competence when the conservative political party is in power. Manipulating the audience could also further illuminate the role of status stereotypes as a driver of effects—for example, testing whether Black or Latinx conservatives upshift competence to any high-status audience, regardless of race. Simultaneously, future work should continue to examine same-race interactions, which provides a crucial control condition when testing interracial behavior.

Minority politicians and laypeople upshifted competence via increased references to high power (Study 1), ability (Study 2), or status (Study 3). Drawing on research suggesting the primacy of status and ability^{32,34}, this work predicted and found that Black and Latinx hierarchy-based conservatives referenced more power in contexts where status and ability had already been established (such as political arenas with elected officials). In contrast, conservatives referenced more ability or status novel social scenarios, such as social media posts or introductions. All comprise competence upshifts. However, observers may react differently to displays of high power, status, or ability. Thus, future work should further examine the conditions under which—and reasons for which—competence upshifts manifest as references to high status, power, or ability.

Future work can also explore how racial minorities distance themselves from the ingroup in more nuanced linguistic ways. Codeswitching—switching between styles to resolve basic communicative needs—and styleswitching—an intentional shift in speaking to align oneself with context or perceived identity—both refer to speech alteration^{51,52}. The competence upshift may be a form of styleswitching, which is theorized to be an audience response⁵¹. Styleswitching involves shifts in syntactic, morphological, and phonological patterns—not just word choice⁵². Future work should test whether Black and Latinx conservatives styleswitch by adopting “Standard” (versus African American Vernacular) English in mostly-White settings. This too, could be a form of ingroup distancing. Though no style of communication is superior, exploring when and how racial minorities shift language—and to what effect—constitutes a crucial area of study, for it may predict who is most liked and respected.

Further exploring the various identities that predict a competence upshift can further illuminate the mechanisms that drive it. Meta-analyses found that low-SES Black Americans also engaged in the predicted competence upshift, referencing high status more than their high-SES peers in novel written introductions to a White partner. A mechanism driving this competence upshift could also be stereotype reversal. Low-SES Black Americans may be trying to distance themselves from low-status stereotypes. It stands to reason that this distancing behavior also manifests among working class individuals, who have fewer resources at their disposal.

Relatedly, do gender-based competence upshifts occur? Women can shift their language based on the audience, altering their verbal behavior with a mostly-male (versus -female) audience⁵³. Future work can test whether, how, and which women upshift competence in mostly-male settings—and determine whether this behavior is subject to a backlash effect.

Future work must further consider the implications of this phenomenon by examining how Black and Latinx Americans who upshift competence are perceived. If Black and Latinx conservatives are seen as more competent than Black and Latinx liberals, then this may help maintain White supremacy by giving Black and Latinx conservatives an institutional and societal advantage. Mostly-White institutions may diversify by hiring and promoting Black or Latinx conservatives, who present themselves as more competent than liberals. This could ultimately maintain the current social, cultural, political, and economic order by selectively granting status and resources to racial minorities who prefer inequality.

That said, this work cannot speak to the intentionality of a competence upshift; these data do not determine whether Black and Latinx conservatives deliberately upshift competence toward White Americans. People may be reluctant to report having specific goals based on audience race¹⁰. However, one could test whether Black or Latinx conservatives are less likely to upshift competence under a time constraint. With little time to respond, Black or Latinx conservatives may no longer upshift, suggesting that this behavior is relatively deliberate.

In the wake of global protests supporting racial justice, the world stands poised to hear more Black and Latinx voices than ever before—in newsrooms, on campaign trails, and in boardrooms. This work reveals that there is variability in Black and Latinx Americans' ideology and indeed, voices—with implications for how they are portrayed by the media. Exploring if, when, and how people reverse stereotypes in interracial settings can reveal who gets along and who gets ahead in a diverse world.

Method

This research complied with all relevant ethical regulations. Field studies (Studies 1, 2, and 4) were conducted on publicly available datasets, rendering them exempt from IRB approval. Due to the archival nature of these data, data collection and analyses were not conducted blind to conditions. Experiments (Studies 3a–3d) were approved by the IRB at Yale University; informed consent was obtained by all participants. Participants were randomly assigned to condition using the Qualtrics randomization feature; variables were randomly presented. All analyses are based on two-sided tests. All effect sizes are reported as standardized beta weights, and confidence intervals for effect sizes were estimated using bootstrapping.

Study 1

Sample determination. Sample size was determined by the number of Black and Latinx politicians elected to Congress with text records of their Congressional remarks (that is, those who served after 1995, when the Congressional Record became readily-available in text format). An initial search process resulted in a total of 156 Black ($n = 95$) and Latinx ($n = 61$) lawmakers elected to Congress between 1971 and 2017 who served after 1995. Asian American lawmakers were not included, as this racial group is not subject to the same low-competence/-status stereotypes theorized to drive a competence upshift among racial minorities who are more supportive of hierarchy. These criteria combine Black and Latinx speakers. This decision was made based on findings that, as noted, Black and Latinx Americans are

stereotyped as similarly low in status, power, and ability^{6,8}; it also affords more statistical power. After this selection process, each Black and Latinx politician was matched with a White politician on gender, political party, approximate term in office, and region of election. This left a total of 312 Black, Latinx, and White lawmakers (92 women, 220 men) elected over four decades (see Supplementary Methods for list). Sample size was limited by the number of Black and Latinx politicians elected to Congress since 1971 with publicly-available congressional remarks and ideology scores. This sample size provided 70% power to detect a small⁵⁴ Politician Ideology × Politician Race interaction effect of $f^2 = .02$. For all studies, the sample size was determined before data analysis.

Speech collection. All politicians' Congressional remarks were collected using the Congressional Record, a substantially verbatim online archive of all remarks made by lawmakers on the floor of the Senate or the House of Representatives. The programming language Python was used to collect all remarks ($n = 259,458$) made by identified Black, Latinx, and White lawmakers between 1995 and December 2018 (time of data collection). All lawmakers made at least one remark, with the number of remarks for each lawmaker ranging from 13 to 19,212.

Hierarchy-based conservatism. Estimating legislative ideology using roll-call voting behavior constitutes the current gold standard⁵⁵. This study therefore utilized an established measure that leverages politicians' legislative roll-call voting choices to estimate their liberal/conservative ideology. NOMINATE scores^{24,25,56} are determined by applying multidimensional scaling techniques to politicians' roll-call voting patterns over the course of their Congressional careers. The most recent iteration of NOMINATE scores (DW-NOMINATE scores) for all current and prior lawmakers are available at Voteview.com, where roll call votes are updated daily and DW-NOMINATE scores are updated frequently⁵⁷. These scores tend to be stable over the course of politicians' careers, only changing significantly if a politician switches parties (which is quite rare)⁵⁸. DW-NOMINATE scores were not available for two lawmakers: Congresswoman Jennifer Gonzalez-Colon (a resident commissioner of Puerto Rico) and Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes (a non-voting delegate to the House of Representatives). These lawmakers were therefore excluded from analyses.

Self-presentation of competence. Researchers have long considered quantitative content-analysis of texts to be the most objective approach to linguistic data⁵⁹. Across studies, the stereotype content of all verbal behavior was analyzed using recent advances in natural-language processing. The R package

Semi-Automated Dictionary Creation for Analyzing Text (SADCAT) allows researchers to access validated dictionaries that assess the stereotype content of open-ended text⁶⁰, including dictionaries related to power, status, and ability. Dictionaries were created using iterative processes. Each began with relevant, theory-based seed words before expansion to include semantically-related terms using WordNet. Each provides high levels of coverage, internal reliability, and validity. For in-depth explanations of WordNet's generation process, see ref 61. For more details of dictionary validation, see ref 60.

Three dictionaries represented self-presentation of competence: the high status dictionary, the high ability dictionary, and the high power dictionary. The high status dictionary includes words like "influential", "successful", and "superior". The high ability dictionary includes words like "educated" and "intelligent". Finally, the high power dictionary includes words like "determined", "assertive", and "confident". Each politician was given a score representing the percentage of words from their Congressional remarks that came from each dictionary. Each score thus represented how frequently, on average, each politician referenced high status, ability, or power on the Congressional floor. Higher scores indicated that a greater proportion of words from each dictionary appeared in politicians' aggregated remarks.

Sensitivity analyses. The author made the *a priori* decision not to exclude outliers, thus maximizing statistical power and better representing the diversity of each sample. However, the pattern of results described in each study hold when excluding politicians with studentized deleted residuals greater than three or Cook's D scores greater than .10 ($N_{S1} = 3$; $N_{S2} = 5$; $N_{S3} = 3$). Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of normality indicated that some variables were not normally distributed across studies. Linear regression analyses are robust to non-normal predictor or outcome variables, however non-normal residuals violate assumptions. Assumptions of linearity, heteroscedasticity, and normality of residuals were assessed visually, yielding no deviations in Studies 1 and 2 (Supplementary Figures 1–4). Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of normality supported visual assessments; residuals for key outcome variables were normally distributed in Studies 1 and 2 ($p_s > .132$). Correlations between predictor variables were small-to-medium (see Supplementary Tables 1 and 2), and variance inflation factors ranged from 1 to 5 (see Supplementary Table 3), suggesting no multicollinearity.

Two deviations of normality emerged, prompting supplementary analyses. First, visual assessment suggested that DW-NOMINATE scores were bimodal in Studies 1 and 2, with separate modes among

Democratic and Republican politicians. Although the residuals for these studies were normal, supplemental analyses addressed potential concerns about this bimodality by testing Democrats and Republicans separately. Second, residuals for status references in Study 3 were non-normal (Kolmogorov-Smirnov: $p < .001$), likely due to a portion of participants who did not reference high status. Supplemental analyses thus tested a dichotomous indicator of high status references using binary logistic regression, which does not assume normality of residuals. These results largely mirror those reported in each study (see Supplementary Results).

Analyses. Three multiple regression models predicted politicians' references to high status, high ability, and high power on the Congressional floor. All models included DW-NOMINATE scores (the continuous indicator of politician ideology, standardized), politician race (1 = Black or Latinx, -1 = White), and the interaction between politician ideology and politician race. See Supplementary Table 1 for descriptive statistics and intercorrelations. See Supplementary Table 4 for full regression analyses.

Study 2

Sample determination. Sample size was determined by the number of White, Black, Latinx lawmakers serving in the 116th U.S. Congress with an active twitter profile. For those with multiple profiles, the "official" profile was chosen. This search process resulted in 420 White and 95 Black ($n = 55$) or Latinx ($n = 40$) lawmakers seated in the House or Senate (95% of all Congress members; see Supplementary Methods for a full list). Sample size was limited to the number of Black and Latinx politicians seated in Congress at the time of data collection (August 2019) with public Twitter accounts. This sample size provided 89% power to detect a small⁵⁴ Politician Ideology \times Politician Race effect size of $f^2 = .02$.

Tweet collection. The standard Twitter API was used to collect tweets posted by each lawmaker. This automated script downloaded the 3,200 most recent tweets posted by all lawmakers. Once this tweet collection process was complete, duplicate tweets, "retweets", and links were deleted. The final sample consisted of 936,722 original tweets by White, Black, and Latinx politicians seated in the 116th Congress.

Hierarchy-based conservatism. Once the tweet collection process was complete, lawmakers' behavioral support for inequality was assessed using DW-NOMINATE; scores were collected from the website Voteview.com. Scores were not available for six politicians, leaving a total sample of 511 politicians with publicly available twitter accounts and ideology scores (419 White, 55 Black, and 37 Latinx politicians).

Self-Presentation of competence. The stereotype content of lawmakers' tweets was again measured using SADCAT. As in Study 1, three dictionaries represented self-presentation of competence: the high status dictionary, the high power dictionary, and the high ability dictionary. Higher scores indicated a greater proportion of words from each dictionary appeared in tweets.

Analyses. Three separate multiple regression models predicted references to high status, ability, and power in politicians' tweets. All models included DW-NOMINATE scores (continuous indicator of politicians' ideology, standardized), politician race (1 = Black or Latinx, -1 = White), and the interaction between politician ideology and politician race. See Supplementary Table 1 for descriptive statistics and intercorrelations. See Supplementary Table 5 for full regression analyses.

Study 3

Participants. Participants of the online labor market, Prolific Academic⁶² were invited to take part in a study about online communication. Five-hundred and thirty Black Americans completed a 20-30 minute survey in exchange for \$3.50. One hundred and twenty-three participants reported that they were non-Black, multi-racial, or first-generation American. These participants were excluded, leaving a final sample size of 407 Black Americans. This sample size provided greater than 80% power to detect a small⁵⁴ Participant Ideology × Partner Race interaction at an effect size of $f^2 = .02$. Participants (157 men, 243 women, 7 non-binary) ranged in age from 18 to 72 ($M_{age} = 33.12$, $SD_{age} = 12.43$), and 209 participants had a college degree or an advanced degree.

This study focus on descendants of enslaved people in the United States, as they have been stereotyped as lower in status, power, and ability for centuries^{6,8,63,64}. While stereotypes associated with Black Americans who immigrated to the United States are likely similar, they are less empirically validated. The study did include second-generation Black Americans for, having been born and raised Black in the U.S., they have likely spent their lives subject to stereotypes theorized to drive a competence upshift.

Procedure and measures. Online communities provide opportunities for affiliation, goal achievement, exchange of information, and social support⁶⁵, prompting behavior consistent with impression management goals⁶⁶. This study adopted an experimental paradigm used by Dupree and Fiske¹⁰, in which participants create an online profile to introduce themselves to another participant. Participants

believe that their partner is a peer and that they will experience a sustained interaction with this person—enough to elicit impression management goals⁶⁷. Participants are first invited to meet their online partner—another participant who purportedly created their online profile during a prior study. Participants then create their own profile, which they are told will be directly forwarded to their online partner. This paradigm allows for precise manipulation of the interaction partner’s characteristics by altering the profile presumably created by their partner.

Interaction partner. Participants first viewed the name and avatar of their online partner. Those randomly assigned to a White interaction partner viewed an avatar with light skin, blond hair, blue eyes, and a stereotypically White first name (Emily or Jake). Those randomly assigned to a Black interaction partner viewed an avatar with medium-brown skin, brown hair, brown eyes, and a stereotypically Black first name (Tamara or Darnell). Partners were gender-matched to participants.

After meeting their partner, participants began their online profile, providing their own first name and selecting an avatar to represent them. To ensure saliency of the partner’s race, participants next viewed a page with their own name and avatar and that of their partner.

Self-presentation of competence. Participants then wrote their open-ended introduction. The following page, entitled “Introduce yourself!”, included an essay box with the following instructions: “We would like for you to introduce yourself to your online partner by creating a personal profile. Please use full sentences and write as much as you can to make sure that your online partner gets a good sense of who you are (include at least 5 sentences). For example, you could write about your favorite sports or hobbies, your work or education, your social life, your appearance or personality, your family.”

Hierarchy-based conservatism. After responding to their online partner and completing exploratory measures (see Supplementary Methods for measure details), participants completed a highly-validated measure of hierarchy-based conservatism, or support for inequality: social dominance orientation. Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) assesses support for hierarchy, including items such as “Group equality should not be our primary goal” and “We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups” (reversed) (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree; SDO-7¹⁷).

Analyses. Three multiple regression models predicted references to high status, high power, and high

ability in Black Americans' written introductions. Models included social dominance orientation (continuous indicator of hierarchy-based conservatism, standardized), partner race (1 = Black, -1 = White), and the interaction term. See Supplementary Table 2 (Study 3d) for descriptive statistics and intercorrelations; see Supplementary Table 6 for full regression analyses.

Meta-analysis

Participants. Participants in Studies 3a–3d were recruited using various online labor markets that screen users based on self-reported ethnicity, including Amazon Mechanical Turk⁶⁸ and Prolific Academic⁶². The initial sample size target was 75 participants per condition, based on recommendations (e.g., ref 100) when Study 3a was run (2014). This later increased to 150-200 participants per condition, to meet increasing sample size recommendations when Studies 3b (2017), 3c (2019) and 3d (2020) were run. Final sample sizes provided 36% (Study 3a), 63% (Study 3b), 79% (Study 3c), and 81% (Study 3d) power to detect a small⁵⁴ interactive effect. All participants were included unless they reported that they were non-Black, multi-racial, or first-generation American. See Supplementary Table 7 for sample details.

Procedure and measures. Participants completed the same procedure described in Study 3.

Hierarchy-based Conservatism. SDO assessed hierarchy-based conservatism. In Study 3a, participants completed the SDO₆ scale²⁶; in Studies 3b–3d, participants completed the 8- or 16-item SDO-7 scale¹⁷.

Values-based conservatism. In Studies 3a–3c, RWA assessed support for traditional morals, conventions, and authority figures, including items such as “Group equality should not be our primary goal” and “We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups” (reverse-scored) (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). Participants completed the validated 15-item RWA scale⁷⁰.

Self-reported ideology. Participants completed a single-item indicator of self-reported political ideology (1 = very conservative, 7 = very liberal; reversed). In Study 3c, participants self-reported both social and economic liberalism/conservatism (1 = very liberal, 7 = very conservative). A political ideology composite was created by standardizing and averaging both items. (Analyzing self-reported social or economic ideology alone did not alter results.)

Analyses. The SPSS macro MeanES⁷¹ was used for all meta-analytic calculations. The goal was to make inferences about effect parameters in these studies, thus, fixed effects models were used⁷², increasing statistical power to detect predicted effects⁷³. See Supplementary Table 8 for within-study results.

Study 4

Politician sample. This study re-examines the 310 politicians whose Congressional speech was analyzed in Study 1: 156 White and 154 Black (n = 94) or Latinx (n = 60) politicians. Study 1's politician sample was preferable to Study 2's as it provided an equal number of White and minority (Black, Latinx) politicians and included remarks made over a longer period of time (1995 to 2018).

Politician ideology and power references in congress. Politicians' liberal-conservative ideology was assessed using the same DW-Nominate scores collected from VoteView.com for Study 1. In Study 1, Black and Latinx conservatives referenced high power more than liberals when speaking on the Congressional floor. Study 4 therefore focused on power references. SADCAT determined politician's references to high power in Congressional remarks.

Editorial sample: Coverage of politicians. The Dow Jones & Company's Factiva database (<https://global.factiva.com/>) was searched for news editorials referencing each politician in the headline during their term. The search criteria specified the following: (i) major news and business publications, United States; (ii) editorials, not letters, not letters to the editor, not commentaries/opinions; (iii) United States; and (iv) "[politician name]". For politicians who shared a name with a famous individual (e.g., Al Green), politician party and state (e.g., D-TX) was included or results were sorted manually.

A total of 274 politicians (91 Black, 50 Latinx, 138 White) had at least one editorial (M = 65.63 editorials) about them, with a total of 17,984 editorials. For politicians with over 100 editorials (e.g., Barack Obama), the number of editorials was limited to the 100 most recent during their Congressional term (10% of sample). The final sample size was limited to the number of White, Black, and Latinx politicians with publicly available Congressional remarks and targeted editorials. A sensitivity analysis using the final sample size of 274 politicians with editorials revealed that the study was 80% powered to detect a small-to-medium⁸⁵ interactive (Politician Ideology × Politician Race) effect size of $f^2 = .047$.

Competence References within Editorials. Again focusing on references to high power, the stereotype content of all editorials was analyzed using SADCAT, resulting in a score representing journalists' references to high power in targeted editorials.

Analyses. Pearson R correlations first tested the relationship between politicians' power references in Congress and journalists' power references in editorials. A multiple regression model next predicted power references in journalists' editorials. The model included DW-NOMINATE (continuous indicator of politician ideology, standardized), politician race (1 = Black or Latinx, -1 = White), and the interaction term. Moderated mediation analyses tested whether minority politicians' power references mediated journalists' power references. Politician Ideology, Politician Power References, Editorial Power References, and Politician Race were entered into a moderated mediation model (Process, model 7⁴⁴) with politician power references as the mediator and politician race as the moderator.

Data availability

All data supporting the findings in this manuscript are available on the Open Science Foundation and can be found here : (link provided upon acceptance of manuscript).

Code availability

All code for analyses supporting the findings in this manuscript are available on the Open Science Foundation and can be found here: (link provided upon acceptance of manuscript).

References

1. Vespa, J., Medina, L., & Amstrong, D. M. *Demographic turning points for the United States: Population projections for 2020 to 2060* (US Census Bureau, 2018).
2. Bailik, K. For the fifth time in a row, the new Congress is the most racially and ethnically diverse ever. *Pew Research Center* <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/02/08/for-the-fifth-time-in-a-row-the-new-congress-is-the-most-racially-and-ethnically-diverse-ever/> (2019).
3. Burns, C., Barton, K., & Kerby, S. The state of diversity in today's workforce: As our nation becomes more diverse so too does our work force. *Center for American Progress* <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2012/07/12/11938/the-state-of-diversity-in-todays-workforce/> (2012).

4. Leary, M. R. *Self-presentation: Impression Management and Interpersonal Behavior*. (Westview Press, 1995).
5. Roberts, S. O. et al. Racial inequality in psychological research: Trends of the past and recommendations for the future. *Perspect. Psychol. Sci.* **15**, 1295-1309 (2020).
6. Dupree, C.H., Torrez, B., Obioha, O., & Fiske, S. T. Race-status associations: Distinct effects of three novel measures among White and Black perceivers. *J. Pers. Soc. Psychol.* **120**, 601–625 (2021).
7. Vorauer, J. D., Hunter, A. J., Main, K. J., & Roy, S. A. Meta- stereotype activation: Evidence from indirect measures for specific evaluative concerns experienced by members of dominant groups in interethnic interaction. *J. Pers. Soc. Psychol.* **78**, 690–707 (2000).
8. Zou, L. & Cheryan, S. Two axes of subordination: A new model of racial position. *J. Pers. Soc. Psychol.* **112**, 696-717 (2017).
9. Bergsieker, H. B., Shelton, J. N., & Richeson, J. A. To be liked versus respected: Divergent goals in interracial interactions. *J. Pers. Soc. Psychol.* **99**, 248–26 (2010).
10. Dupree, C.H., & Fiske, S.T. Self-presentation in interracial settings: The competence downshift by white liberals. *J. Pers. Soc. Psychol.* **117**, 579–604 (2019).
11. White, I. K, & Laird, C. H. *Steadfast Democrats: How Social Forces Shape Black Political Behavior* (Princeton University Press, 2020).
12. Jefferson, H. The curious case of Black conservatives: Construct validity and the 7-point liberal-conservative scale. Preprint at SSRN <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3602209> (2020).
13. Dawson, M. C. *Black Visions: The Roots of Contemporary African American Political Ideologies* (University of Chicago Press, 2001).
14. Philpot, T. *Conservative, but not Republican*. Cambridge University Press, 2017).
15. Bejarano, C. E. *The Latino Gender Gap in U.S. Politics*. (Routledge, 2013).
16. Donato, K.M., & Perez, S.L. A different hue of the gender gap: Latino immigrants and political conservatism in the United States. *Russel Sage J. Soc. Sci.* **2**, 98-124 (2016).
17. Ho, A. K. et al. The nature of social dominance orientation: Theorizing and measuring preferences for intergroup inequality using the new SDO7 scale. *J. Pers. Soc. Psychol.* **109**, 1003–1028 (2015).
18. Stern, C., & Axt, J. R. Group status modulates the associative strength between status quo supporting beliefs and anti-Black attitudes. *Soc. Psychol. Pers. Sci.* **10**, 946–956 (2018).
19. Jost, J. T., & Thompson, E. P. Group-based dominance and opposition to equality as independent predictors of self-esteem, ethnocentrism, and social policy attitudes among African Americans and European Americans. *J. Exp. Soc. Psychol.* **36**, 209–232 (2000).

20. Eastwick, P. W., Richeson, J. A., Son, D., & Finkel, E. J. Is love colorblind? Political orientation and interracial romantic desire. *Pers. Soc. Psychol. B.* **35**, 1258–1268 (2009).
21. Ayala, M. I. The rationalization of college attainment through a color-blind lens among Latino(a) students. *J. Latinos Educ.* **19**, 107–19 (2020).
22. Claessens, S. et al. The dual evolutionary foundations of political ideology. *Nat. Hum. Beh.* **4**, 336–345 (2020).
23. Kteily, N. S., Rocklage, M. D., McClanahan, K., & Ho, A. K. Political ideology shapes the amplification of the accomplishments of disadvantaged vs. advantaged group members. *Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA* **116**, 1559-1568 (2019).
24. Poole, K.T. & Rosenthal, H. A spatial model for legislative roll call analysis. *Am. Jour. Polit. Sci.* **29**, 357–384 (1985).
25. Poole, K. T. & Rosenthal, H. D-Nominate after 10 years: A comparative update to Congress: A political-economic history of roll-call voting. *Legis. Stud. Quart.* **26**, 5–29 (2001).
26. Pratto, F., Sidanius, J., Stallworth, L. M., & Malle, B. F. Social dominance orientation: A personality variable predicting social and political attitudes. *J. Pers. Soc. Psychol.* **67**, 741-763 (1994).
27. Altemeyer, B. *Right-Wing Authoritarianism*. (University of Manitoba Press, 1981).
28. Duckitt, J. & Sibley, C. G. A dual-process motivational model of ideology, politics, and prejudice. *Psychol. Inq.* **20**, 98–109 (2009).
29. Fiske, S. T., Cuddy, A. J. C., & Glick, P. Universal dimensions of social cognition: Warmth and competence. *Trends Cog. Sci.* **11**, 77–83 (2007).
30. Anderson, C., Hildreth, J. A. D., & Howland, L. Is the desire for status a fundamental human motive? A review of the empirical literature. *Psychol. Bull.* **141**, 574-601 (2015).
31. Abele, A. E. et al. Facets of the fundamental content dimensions: Agency with competence and assertiveness – communion with warmth and morality. *Front. Psychol.* **7**, 1-17 (2016).
32. Keltner, D., Van Kleef, G. A., Chen, S., & Kraus, M. W. A reciprocal influence model of social power: Emerging principles and lines of inquiry. *Adv. Exp. Soc. Psychol.* **40**, 151– 192 (2008).
33. Adams, J. S. Inequity in social exchange. *Adv. Exp. Soc. Psychol.* **62**, 335-343 (1965).
34. Fast, N. J., & Chen, S. When the boss feels inadequate power, incompetence, and aggression. *Psychol. Sci.* **20**, 1406–1413 (2009).
35. Utz, S. The potential benefits of campaigning via social network sites. *Jour. Comput.-Mediat. Comm.* **14**, 221-243 (2009).

36. Rosnow, R. L., & Rosenthal, R. Statistical procedures and the justification of knowledge in Psychol. Sci.. *Amer. Psychol.* **44**, 1276–1284 (1989).
37. Goh, J. X., Hall, J., & Rosenthal, R. Mini meta-analysis of your own studies: Some arguments on why and a primer on how. *Soc. Pers. Psychol. Comp.* **10**, 535–549 (2016).
38. Lewis, A. *Conservatism in the Black community*. (New York; NY: Routledge, 2013).
39. Devine, P. G., & Elliot, A. J. Are racial stereotypes really fading? The Princeton trilogy revisited. *Pers. Soc. Psychol. B.* **21**, 1139–1150 (1995).
40. Ambady, N., Bernieri, F., & Richeson, J. A. Toward a histology of social behavior: Judgmental accuracy from thin slices of the behavioral stream. *Adv. Exp. Soc. Psychol.* **32**, 201–271 (2000).
41. Kraus, M. W., Torrez, B., Park, J. W. L., & Ghayebi, F. The reproduction of social class in brief speech. *Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA* **116**, 22998-23003 (2019).
42. Frimer, J. A. et al. A decline in prosocial language helps explain public disapproval of the U.S. Congress. *Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA* **112**, 6591–6594 (2015).
43. Grieco, E. Newsroom employees are less diverse than U.S. workers overall. *Pew Research Center* <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/11/02/newsroom-employees-are-less-diverse-than-u-s-workers-overall/> (2018).
44. Hayes, A. F. *Introduction to Mediation, Moderation, and Conditional Process Analysis: A Regression-based Approach*. (New York, NY: Guilford, 2013).
45. AlShebli, B.K., Rahwan, T. & Woon, W.L. The preeminence of ethnic diversity in scientific collaboration. *Nat. Comm.* **9**, 51-63 (2018).
46. Richeson, J. A., & Shelton, J. N. Negotiating interracial interactions: Costs, consequences, and possibilities. *Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci.* **16**, 316–320 (2007).
47. Voigt R. et al. Language from police body camera footage shows racial disparities in officer respect. *Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA* **114**, 6521-6526 (2017).
48. Lucas, B. J., & Kteily, N. S. (Anti-) egalitarianism differentially predicts empathy for members of advantaged versus disadvantaged groups. *J. Pers. Soc. Psychol.* **114**, 665-692 (2018).
49. Bastian, B., & Haslam, N. Psychological essentialism and stereotype endorsement. *J. Exp. Soc. Psychol.* **42**, 228–235 (2006).
50. Lakoff, G. *Moral politics*. (University of Chicago Press, 1996).
51. Gallois, C., Ogay, T., & Giles, H. in *Theorizing about Intercultural Communication* (ed. Gudykunst, W.) 121 – 148 (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2005).

52. Gaither, S., Cohen-Goldberg, A., Gidney, C. L., Maddox, K. Sounding Black or White: Priming identity and biracial speech. *Front. Psychol.* **6**, 1–11 (2015).
53. Yu, B. Language and gender in Congressional speech. *Lit. Linguist. Comput.* **29**, 118-132 (2014).
54. Cohen, J. *Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences*. (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1988).
55. Barberá, P. et al. Tweeting from left to right: Is online political communication more than an echo chamber? *Psychol. Sci.* **26**, 1531–1542 (2015).
56. Clinton, J. S., Jackman, S., & Rivers, D. The statistical analysis of roll call data. *Am. Polit. Sci. Rev.* **98**, 355–370 (2004).
57. Lewis, J. B. et al. Voteview: Congressional roll-call votes database. <https://voteview.com/> (2020).
58. McCarty, N., Poole, K. T., & Rosenthal, H. The hunt for party discipline in congress. *Am. Polit. Sci. Rev.* **95**, 673–87 (2001).
59. Silverman, D. *Interpreting qualitative data: Methods for analyzing talk, text and interaction*. (London, UK: Sage, 1993).
60. Nicolas, G., Bai, B., & Fiske, S. Automated Dictionary Creation for Analyzing Text: An Illustration from Stereotype Content. *Eur. J. Soc. Psych.* Advance online publication (2020)
61. Fellbaum, C. *WordNet: An Electronic Lexical Database*. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998).
62. Peer, E., Brandimarte, L., Samat, S., & Acquisti, A. Beyond the Turk: Alternative platforms for crowdsourcing behavioral research. *J. Exp. Soc. Psychol.* **70**, 153-163 (2017).
63. Bonilla-Silva, E. *Racism without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in the United States*, **5** (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017).
64. Saini, A. *Superior: The Return of Race Science* (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2019).
65. Ridings, C. M., & Gefen, D. Virtual community attraction: Why people hang out online. *J. Comput.-Mediat. Comm.* **10**, 4 (2004).
66. Dino, A., Reysen, S., & Branscombe, N. R. Online interactions between group members differing in status. *J. Lang. Soc. Psychol.* **28**, 85–93 (2009).
67. Walther, J. B. Computer-mediated communication: Impersonal, interpersonal, and hyperpersonal interaction. *Comm. Res* **23**, 3-43 (1996).
68. Horton, J. J., Rand, D. G. & Zeckhauser, R. J. The online laboratory: conducting experiments in a real labor market. *Exp. Econ.* **14**, 399–425 (2011).
69. Simmons, J. P., Nelson, L. D., & Simonsohn, U. False-positive psychology: Undisclosed flexibility in data collection and analysis allows presenting anything as significant. *Psychol. Sci.* **22**, 1359–1366 (2011).

70. Zakrisson, I. (2005). Construction of a short version of the right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) scale. *Pers. Ind. Diff.* **39**, 863–872 (2005).
71. Wilson, D. B. Meta-analysis macros for SAS, SPSS, and Stata. <http://mason.gmu.edu/~dwilsonb/ma.html> (2005).
72. Hedges, L. V., & Vevea, J. L. Fixed- and random-effects models in meta-analysis. *Psychol. Methods* **3**, 486–504 (1998).
73. Cohn, L. D., & Becker, B. J. How meta-analysis increases statistical power. *Psychol. Methods* **8**, 243–253 (2003).

Acknowledgements

Author contributions

Competing interests

The author declares no competing interests.

Figure legends

Figure 1. Power References in Congressional Speech as a Function of Politician Ideology and Politician Race.

Each dot represents an individual politician ($n = 310$). For politician ideology, higher scores represent a more conservative ideology. Scores for power references in Congressional speech (standardized) were obtained in a multiple regression model in which politician ideology and politician race were the predictors. For Black and Latinx politicians (green line; $n = 154$), politician ideology predicted references to high power in Congressional speech: $t(306) = 4.49$, $p < .001$, $\beta = .35$, 95% CI = [.20, .51]. For White politicians (red line; $n = 156$), the association was not significant: $t(306) = 1.31$, $p = .191$, $\beta = .11$, 95% CI = [−.05, .26]. The shade around lines denotes the s.e.m.

Figure 2. Ability References in Congressional Tweets as a Function of Politician Ideology and Politician Race.

Each dot represents an individual politician ($n = 511$). For politician ideology, higher scores represent a

more conservative ideology. Scores for high ability references in Congressional tweets (standardized) were obtained in a multiple regression model in which politician ideology and politician race were the predictors. For Black and Latinx politicians (green line; $n = 92$), politician ideology predicted references to high ability in Congressional tweets: $t(507) = 4.11, p < .001, \beta = .70, 95\% \text{ CI} = [.37, 1.03]$. For White politicians (red line; $n = 419$), the association was not significant: $t(507) = 0.14, p = .886, \beta = .01, 95\% \text{ CI} = [-.09, .10]$. The shade around each line denotes the s.e.m.

Figure 3. Indirect Effects of Politician Ideology Predicting Power References in Editorials via Power References in Congressional Speech for Black and Latinx or White Politicians.

For ideology, higher scores represent more conservative ideology. (c') represent direct effects, (c) represent total effects. (A) For Black and Latinx politicians ($n = 141$), the indirect effect of politician ideology on power references in editorials through politicians' power references in Congress reached significance [indirect effect = .06, 95% CI (.01, .11)]. (B) For White politicians ($n = 138$), this indirect effect did not reach significance [indirect effect = .01, 95% CI (-.02, .06)].

Tables

Table 1. Meta-Analyses Testing Effects of Social Dominance Orientation (SDO), Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA), and Self-Reported Ideology on Black Americans' References to Status, Power, and Ability with a White or Black Interaction Partner

Predictor and outcome	White interaction partner ^a			Black interaction partner ^b		
	β	95% CI	p	β	95% CI	p
SDO						
Status references	.16	[.08, .24]	.000	-.02	[-.10, .06]	.611
Power references	-.02	[-.10, .06]	.593	.03	[-.05, .11]	.435
Ability references	-.01	[-.09, .07]	.824	.01	[-.07, .09]	.821
RWA						
Status references	.05	[-.05, .15]	.296	.05	[-.05, .15]	.301
Power references	-.11	[-.21, -.01]	.032	.03	[-.07, .12]	.604
Ability references	-.01	[-.11, .09]	.875	-.07	[-.16, .03]	.192
Self-reported ideology						
Status references	.01	[-.07, .10]	.767	-.01	[-.10, .07]	.736
Power references	-.05	[-.14, .03]	.183	.05	[-.03, .13]	.242
Ability references	-.03	[-.11, .05]	.492	.06	[-.02, .15]	.161

Note. Results for fixed models shown. All continuous variables were standardized. For effects of Ideology, lower scores = more liberal, higher scores = more conservative. ^atotal $n = 578$; ^btotal $n = 610$